The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Thomas C. Horne; Bruce R. Wisan; Mark Shurtleff; and Hon. Denise Posse Lindberg; et al. : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2012
The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Thomas C. Horne; Bruce R.
Wisan; Mark Shurtleff; and Hon. Denise Posse
Lindberg; et al. : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rodney R. Parker; Richard A. Van Wagoner; Frederick M. Gedicks; Snow, Chrstenensen and
Martineau; Kenneth A. Okazaki; Stephen C. Clark; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough;
Attorneys for Plantiff-Appellee.
Thomas C. Horne; Attorney General; Mark P. Bookholder; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys
for Defendant-Appellant Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General .
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, No. 20120158.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2012).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3152
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
THOMAS C. HORNE; BRUCE R. WISAN; 
MARK SHURTLEFF; HON. DENISE 
POSSE LINDBERG, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
RICHARD JESSOP REAM, THOMAS 
SAMUEL STEED, DON RONALD 
FISCHER, DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW, 
WALTER SCOTT FISCHER, RICHARD 
GILBERT, and BRENT JEFFS, 
Interveners-Appellants. 
No. 20120158-SC 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
THOMAS C. HORNE 
ARIZONA ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
Matter on Certified Question 
Kenneth A. Okazaki 
Stephen C. Clark 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough SLC 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Rodney R. Parker 
Frederick M. Gedicks 
Snow Christensen & Martineau 
[th Floor 10 Exchange Place, 11 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Thomas C. Home 
Attorney General 
Firm State Bar No. 14000 
Mark P. Bookholder 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Bar No. 025374 
1275 W. Washington 
Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2997 
(602) 542-8346 
(602) 542-3393 (fax) 
Mark.bookholder@azag.gov 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Thomas 
C. Home, Arizona Attorney General FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COUP 
MAY 2 | 2012 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
THOMAS C. HORNE; BRUCE R. WISAN; 
MARK SHURTLEFF; HON. DENISE 
POSSE LINDBERG, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
RICHARD JESSOP REAM, THOMAS 
SAMUEL STEED, DON RONALD 
FISCHER, DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW, 
WALTER SCOTT FISCHER, RICHARD 
GILBERT, and BRENT JEFFS, 
Intervenors-Appellants. 
No.20120158-SC 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
THOMAS C. HORNE 
ARIZONA ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
Matter on Certified Question 
Kenneth A. Okazaki 
Stephen C. Clark 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough SLC 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Rodney R. Parker 
Frederick M. Gedicks 
Snow Christensen & Martineau 
ith Floor 10 Exchange Place, 11 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Thomas C. Home 
Attorney General 
Finn State Bar No. 14000 
Mark P. Bookholder 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Bar No. 025374 
1275 W. Washington 
Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2997 
(602) 542-8346 
(602) 542-3393 (fax) 
Mark.bookholder@azag.gov 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Thomas 
C. Home, Arizona Attorney General 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CITATIONS ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. The Parties Agree That Dismissal of a Petition for Extraordinary Writ 
Accompanied by a Written Opinion May Bar the Later Adjudication of the 
Same Claim 1 
II. The Dismissal of a Claim on the Basis of Laches Is a Dismissal "on the 
Merits." 2 
III. The Certified Question Briefing Is Not the Appropriate Forum for 
Challenging the Lindberg Opinion 5 
CONCLUSION 7 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)(1) 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 10 
< 
I 
< 
1 
I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CITATIONS 
Page 
Cases 
4501 Northpoint LP v. Maricopa County, 
212 Ariz. 98, 128 P.3d 215 (2006) 4 
Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, 
826 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1987) 3 
Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 
2002 UT 77, 52 P.3d 1267 6, 7 
Day v. Estate of Wiswall, 
93 Ariz. 400, 381 P.2d 217 (1963) 4 
Federated Dep 't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 
452 U.S. 394,101 S.Ct. 2424 (1981) 7 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day v. Lindberg, 
2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054 2, 5, 6, 7 
Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 
99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 5 P.3d 874 (2000) 4, 5 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 
575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978) 1 
Kimmel v. Texas Commerce Bank, 
817 F.2d 39 (7th Cir.1987) 3 
Perez v. Richard Roe 1, 
146 Cal. App. 4th 171, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Cal. App. 2006) 5 
n Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rules 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) 3 
111. Sup. Ct. Rule 273 3 
Utah. R. App. P. 41(c) 5 
Other Authorities 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. a (1982) 4 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 20(a) and comment c (1982) 3 
Restatement of Judgments § 49 (1942) 3 
iii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I. The Parties Agree That Dismissal of a Petition for Extraordinary Writ 
Accompanied by a Written Opinion May Bar the Later Adjudication of the 
Same Claim, 
The Appellee ("Plaintiff-Association") acknowledges that "where the court gives a 
written explanation of the reasons for dismissing a petition for extraordinary writ, the 
preclusive effect of the dismissal depends upon the express terms of the writing as well as 
the nature of the case and the circumstances of the denial." (Appellees' Opening Brief 
["Ass'n Br."] at 2-3.) Thus, the Plaintiff-Association agrees that the dismissal of a 
petition for extraordinary writ may have a preclusive effect on the claims alleged. 
This recognition comports with this Court's opinion in Kennecott Copper Corp, v. 
Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978). There, the Court recognized that the denial 
of a petition for extraordinary writ "without any opinion is consistent with the view this 
court merely refused to exercise its original jurisdiction, or it was of the opinion an 
extraordinary writ was not a proper remedy." 575 P.2d at 708. On the other hand, the 
Court also recognized that a judgment denying a writ of prohibition without a written 
opinion may nonetheless be res judicata if "the sole possible ground of the denial was 
that the court acted on the merits" or where "it affirmatively appears the denial was 
intended to be on the merits." Id. Two important principles may be drawn from 
Kennecott. First, even without a written opinion, a dismissal or denial of a petition for 
extraordinary may still nonetheless be res judicata. Second, where the dismissal of the 
petition appears to be "on the merits" within the meaning of that term for preclusion 
purposes, the dismissal is res judicata. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
While the Court has the discretion to summarily deny a petition for extraordinary 
writ for no reason at all, where the Court accepts briefing, hears oral argument, and issues 
an opinion, it has exercised its discretion to review the matters presented. Where the 
Court issues an opinion under those circumstances, the opinion is provided for a reason. 
It is neither an advisory opinion nor pure dicta. 
Because the Court exercised its discretion to review the petition, heard oral 
argument, and issued a written opinion explaining its determination in Fundamentalist 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054, the 
determination of whether the dismissal is preclusive depends on what the Court stated as 
the basis for the dismissal. Plaintiff-Association acknowledges this by stating that "the 
preclusive effect of the dismissal depends upon the express terms of the writing." (Ass'n 
Br. At 2-3.) 
The point of contention between the Appellants and the Plaintiff-Association thus 
appears to be on the following question: Does a dismissal on the basis of laches 
constitute a decision "on the merits" such that later adjudication of the same claim is 
barred? 
II. The Dismissal of a Claim on the Basis of Laches Is a Dismissal "on the 
Merits." 
For the reasons stated in the Appellants' Opening Briefs, a dismissal on the basis 
of laches constitutes a decision "on the merits" that bars a later adjudication of the same 
claim. 
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If, for example, the Court reviews a petition for extraordinary writ and dismisses it 
as unripe, there is no preclusive effect if those claims eventually ripen into a justiciable 
controversy. On the other hand, if the Court states that the petitioner's claims are barred 
by the statute of limitations, it is clear that the petitioner is barred from reasserting those 
claims at a later date. Under those circumstances, the Court has determined that the time 
to assert those claims has come and gone. The same is true of laches. 
In American National Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 826 F.2d 1547 (7th 
Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit provides clarity on this issue: 
A decision "on the merits" bars further litigation; a decision 
"not on the merits" does not. "Dismissed for want of 
jurisdiction" is the common conclusion of an opinion that has 
not reached the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); 111. Sup. Ct. 
Rule 273; Restatement of Judgments § 49 (1942); 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 20(a) and comment c 
(1982). So if the court says "you have come to the wrong 
court, try another" or "this suit is premature, wait until the 
case is ripe" it will use the language of jurisdiction. Such 
adjudications, not "on the merits," may be followed by 
litigation in the right court or at the right time. But if the court 
says "you are too late" or otherwise wraps up the case in a 
way that indicates that the plaintiff has irrevocably failed, the 
use of jurisdictional language does not mean that the plaintiff 
may try again. A decision may be "on the merits" for 
purposes of preclusion even though the court did not resolve 
the merits. A dismissal for want of prosecution has this effect, 
see Kimmel v. Texas Commerce Bank, 817 F.2d 39 (7th 
Cir. 1987), as does a dismissal for laches. Smith v. Chicago, 
supra. 
Id. at 1552-53 (emphasis added). The Arizona Supreme Court has also explained: 
[C]ourts often describe a judgment as being "on the merits" if 
it finally resolves an action in a manner that precludes later 
relitigation of the claims involved. 
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. * * * 
The Restatement (First) of Judgments §§ 48, 49 (1942) 
provided that judgments rendered ;;on the merits" would have 
claim preclusive effect and identified such judgments as 
based on substantive law rather than merely on rules of 
procedure. Because the phrase "on the merits" now may refer 
to judgments that bar the relitigation of a claim while not 
directly passing on its substance, the Restatement has 
abandoned the phrase as "possibly misleading." Restatement 
[(Second) of Judgments] § 19 cmt. a. 
4501 NorthpointLP v. Maricopa County, 212 Ariz. 98, 101, 128 P.3d 215, 218 (2006). 
Here, the Plaintiff-Association erroneously conflates the "on the merits" language for 
claim and issue preclusion with a substantive review of the underlying claims. As is 
explained in the Appellants' briefs and above, they are not the same. 
Plaintiff-Association argues that Day v. Estate ofWiswall, 93 Ariz. 400, 381 P.2d 
217 (1963), and Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 5 P.3d 874 (2000), 
support its argument that a laches dismissal does not have preclusive effect. (Ass'n Br. at 
14-15.) Appellants explained why Day supports their argument concerning the 
preclusive effect of a decision based on laches and why Johnson is distinguishable. 
Opening Brief of Appellants Wisan and Lindberg at 33-34; Utah Attorney General's First 
Brief at 21-22. 
The Johnson opinion is inconsistent with Utah jurisprudence generally holding 
that a dismissal, with certain limited exceptions, constitutes a "decision on the merits." 
Arizona Attorney General's Opening Brief at 16-18. Additionally, a more recent 
California Court of Appeals decision shows a narrowing of the application of the Johnson 
opinion. InPerez v. Richard Roe 7, 146 Cal. App. 4th 171, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Cal. 
4 
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App. 2006), the court explained that where a second action does not allege new facts or a 
new claim, a judgment based on statute of limitations is res judicata. 146 Cal. App. 4th at 
185-86, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 772-73. However, a dismissal on the basis of the statute of 
limitations, like a dismissal on the basis of laches, does not involve an evaluation of the 
substantive merits of the underlying claim. Nonetheless, the court found that res judicata 
applies to a statute-of-limitations dismissal. Given the dichotomy of the case law in 
California and the different approach by Utah courts to the determination of when a 
dismissal is "on the merits," the Johnson opinion offers little to no guidance on the 
certified question before the Court. 
Because the Court declared in Lindberg that the Plaintiff-Association's claims are 
barred by laches, the Court made a determination that they are precluded from asserting 
those claims now or at any time in the future in any Utah state court. What else does it 
mean for claims to be barred by laches? 
III. The Certified Question Briefing Is Not the Appropriate Forum for 
Challenging the Lindberg Opinion, 
Although Plaintiff-Association insists that "[t]he certification process, however, 
does not permit revisitation of Lindberg," it dedicates almost half its brief to doing just 
that. (Ass'n Br.at 5). The Plaintiff-Association is partially correct;1 this is the 
1
 Plaintiff-Association suggests that this Court may only address the certified 
question in the abstract without considering the specific facts in this case. (Ass'n Br. at 
5-6). Although the certified question is a legal issue, the Court must determine the 
question in light of the relevant facts. See Utah. R. App. P. 41(c) ("The order shall also 
set forth all facts which are relevant to the determination of the question certified and 
which show the nature of the controversy, the context in which the question arose, and 
the procedural steps by which the question was framed."). It is therefore appropriate for 
5 
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< 
inappropriate forum for assignments of error to the Lindberg opinion. Those arguments 
are more appropriately addressed in a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States ( 
Supreme Court. Plaintiff-Association sought and received an extension of time to file 
that petition, but chose not to do so. 
Additionally, the correctness of a judicial determination has no bearing on its 
preclusive effect, especially where the party precluded chose not to seek any further 
review. In Collins v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, 52 P.3d 1267, this { 
Court exercised its certiorari jurisdiction. In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals found 
that the petitioners' suit was barred by issue preclusion due to the determination of the 
same issue in an earlier suit they failed to appeal. Id. at f^ 1, 52 P.3d at 1268. The 
petitioners argued that issue preclusion did not apply due to an intervening change in law. 
Id. The Court found no change in law, finding instead that the court of appeals reached 
an erroneous legal conclusion in the earlier suit. Id. at ^ 15, 52 P.3d at 1270. In 
affirming the court of appeals' determination that issue preclusion applied, this Court 
explained: 
Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's opinion in 
Moitie II, we hold that the [petitioners] made a calculated 
choice to forego their appeals and that the predicament in 
which they find themselves is of their own making. Cf. id. at 
400-01, 101 S.Ct. 2424. They could have challenged the 
decision rendered in [the first suit] but elected not to do so. 
They therefore forfeited their right to attack the decision on 
direct appeal and now seek to collaterally attack the 
judgment. However, we 'cannot be expected, for [their] sole 
relief, to upset the general and well established doctrine of res 
the Court to decide the certified question based on the Lindberg laches opinion and not 
on the basis of a hypothetical laches opinion. 
6 
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judicata, conceived in the light of the maxim that the interest 
of the state requires that there be an end to litigation - a 
maxim which comports with common sense as well as public 
policy.' " 
Id at If 19 52 P.3d at 1271 (quoting FederatedDep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 
401-02, 101 S.Ct. 2424 (1981) ("Moitie IF)). Before arriving at this conclusion, the 
Court took note of the following principles articulated in the Moitie II opinion: 
an erroneous conclusion reached by the court in the first suit 
does not deprive the defendants in the second action of their 
right to rely upon the plea of res judicata . . . . A judgment 
merely voidable because [it is] based upon an erroneous view 
of the law is not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected 
by a direct review and not by bringing another action upon 
the same cause [of action]. We have observed that [the] 
indulgence of a contrary view would result in creating 
elements of uncertainty and confusion and in undermining the 
conclusive character of judgments, consequences which it 
was the very purpose of the doctrine of res judicata to avert. 
Id at 77, Tfl8, 52 P.3d at 1271(quoting Moitie II, 452 U.S. at 398-99, 101 S.Ct. 2424). 
Although Plaintiff-Association's attempted assignments of error to the Lindberg 
opinion are without merit, those arguments are irrelevant and therefore not addressed 
herein.2 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and in the Appellants' Opening Briefs, the Court 
should find that under Utah preclusion law, its discretionary review of a petition for 
2
 Nonetheless, it should be noted that in the Lindberg matter, the Plaintiff-Association 
acknowledged its prejudicial delay when it petitioned the Court: "Petitioner Association 
members recognize and acknowledge that time has elapsed since the 'reformation,' and 
that equitable relief may in some individual instances be necessary or appropriate to 
protect reasonable expectations thereby created." Plaintiff-Association's Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ at 2-3. 
7 
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I 
extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches grounds is a decision "on the 
merits/' such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred. i 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of May, 2012. 
Thomas C. Home 
Attorney General < 
//Th^^H^ 
Mark P. Bookholder 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Thomas C. Home, Arizona Attorney 
General 
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